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SURVEY

OF ILLINOIS LAW-19115-1946
TRADE REGULATIONS

In the only case of interest in this field during the judicial
year, the federal district court affirmed the doctrine announced in
Lady Esther, Limited v. Lady Esther Corset Shoppe, Inc., 66 by
holding that the defendant in Elastic Stop Nut Corporation of
America v. Greer 7 was guilty of unfair competition, although
there was no proof of specific instances of palming off, where it
was established that the trade generally was confused by what
the defendant did into thinking that the product of the defendant
was the product of the plaintiff. The court said, "It is sufficient
to warrant injunctive relief if there is the likelihood of confusion
in the trade." 6 " The facts argued for the soundness of the court's
position. The plaintiff therein was a manufacturer of selflocking nuts which it designated as "Elastic Stop Nuts" and
"Stop Nuts." To provide visual identification for its product,
the plaintiff used a red fiber for the insert by which the nut was
locked on the bolt. The natural color of the fiber was gray.
Based on this, it-advertised its product as "nuts with the red
collar."
The defendant undertook to manufacture a substantially identical product. He used a fiber of identical red, asserted
to the trade that his products could be "identified by the red
center" and referred to his products as "Elastic Stop Nuts" and
"Stop Nuts." The similarity was so pronounced that the tendency to provoke a "confusion in the trade" was readily apparent.
VIII. TORTS
Two defamation cases have evoked some interest. In Life
Printing & Publishing Company, Inc. v. Field,1 the Appellate
Court indicated that a corporation can complain of libel only if
the defamatory matter assails its financial position, its business
methods, or accuses it of fraud or mismanagement. Since no
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question of personal reputation can be involved, matter which
might defame an individual will not necessarily establish an
action in favor of the corporation though it might, if spoken or
written about an officer or stockholder, create a personal cause of
action in favor of the latter. It is only when the words spoken
or written of the stockholder or officer directly relate to the trade
or business of the corporation, affecting it in the fashion above
2
indicated, that any corporate cause of action may arise.
Much more complicated, from the factual standpoint, is the
case of Cook v. East Shore Newspapers, Inc.3 The plaintiff was
a judge; the defendant, a newspaper publisher. Considerable
space was devoted in an issue of defendant's paper to a purported
expose of plaintiff's alleged conduct as a job-seller in demanding
and receiving part of the salary of his own judicial employees as
the price of employment. Defendant relied on truth published
with good motive as a defense, basing its action on an affidavit
made by a former employee of plaintiff's. Upon finding that the
matter was only conditionally privileged 4 and that the accusations, being untrue, were libellous per se, the trial judge assessed
punitive damages on the basis that malice in fact had been shown
to exist, making proof of actual loss or injury unnecessary. The
award was affirmed when the Appellate Court indicated that the
right to criticize and condemn public officials "does not include
the right to libel them."
Whether malice, in an action for malicious prosecution, can
be inferred from lack of probable cause was the question posed
in the case of Shelton v. Barry.6 The trial judge there instructed
the jury that, if they found lack of probable cause, such an inference might be drawn. The instruction was held to be erroneous
so the case was returned for a new trial. While the holding is
2 Axton-Fisher Tobacco Co. v. Evening Post Co., 169 Ky. 64, 183 S. W. 269,
L. R. A. 1916E 667, Ann. Cas. 1918B 560 (1916).
3327 Ill. App. 559, 64 N. E.

(2d)

751 (1946).

4 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 4. The defendant was not engaged merely in reporting a judicial proceeding but went beyond that point to assert the accusation
was true.
5 Schmisseur v. Krelich, 92 Ill. 347 (1879).
6 328 Ill. App. 497, 60 N. E.
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not new in Illinois, 7 the point is of sufficient importance to merit
attention. Six elements are necessary for the maintenance of an
action such as this. One of them is that there must be malice in
the institution of the prior proceeding; another, that there must
be want of probable cause. As these are separate and distinct
elements, one cannot logically be infefred from the existence of
the other. Although the presence of probable cause may tend
to negative any idea of malice, the converse is not true. If it
were, only five elements would be necessary for, upon proof of
want of probable cause, malice would automatically exist.
Most of the tort cases had to do with negligence in one form
or another. In Moran v. Gatz,5 the Illinois Supreme Court had
to decide, for the first time, whether or not the right of way
statute 9 absolves the pedestrian from any claim of contributdry
negligence. The Appellate Court had found contributory negligence present as a matter of law when plaintiff, a pedestrian,
continued in a normal walk so as to place herself in the path of
an easily observed oncoming automobile. The Supreme Court
concluded, in line with decisions from other states, that whether
a pedestrian is or is not contributorily negligent is a matter of
fact to be determined by a jury for the right of way statute
does not confer an absolute right against all vehicles under all
circumstances. It was held error, therefore, to decide the point
as a matter of law.
Two railroad cases dealt with the nature of the duty owed
by the public carrier to persons crossing its tracks at a highway
level-crossing. In Healy v. New York Central Railroad Company,10 the complaint charged that defendant left a freight train
7 In
Kaley v. Ilulsman, 319 Ill. App. 219 at 222, 48 N. E. (2d) 768 at 770 (1943),
the court said: ". . . malice may not be presumed from want of probable cause
if all the evidence shows there was no malice."
8390 Ill. 478, 62 N. E. (2d) 443 (1945), reversing 324 Ill. App. 45, 57 N. E.
(2d) 281 (1944).
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 95 1%, § 171, directs that where traffic control signals
are not in place or operation the driver "shall yield the right-of-way, slowing
down or stopping if need be to so yield, to a pedestrian crossing within any .
crosswalk at an intersection."
10 326 Ill. App. 556, 62 N. E. (2d) 707 (1945).
It is understood that leave to
appeal has been denied.
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standing on a switch track at an unguarded crossing in violation
of a rule entered by the Commerce Commission requiring the
carrier to post a flagman or other signal device whenever trains
were on the siding. It was held error to exclude testimony
offered by the plaintiff to establish (1) that the driver of the
car knew of such regulation, and (2) that the railroad company
had been in the habit of keeping a flagman on duty at that point,
since such evidence had direct bearing on the question of due
care and caution for the safety of plaintiff at the time of the
collision. In McKirchy v. Van Sweringen," it was held that a
complaint which charged that the railroad so negligently operated its crossing gates as to cause an automobile driver to speed
up to avoid being trapped on the crossing, whereby the driver
struck' and injured the plaintiff who was a pedestrian walking
on the highway, stated a cause of action against the railroad.
Some consideration of the nature of proximate cause was
provided in the case of Berg v. New York Central Railroad
Company,12 where defendant's train struck an automobile at a
highway crossing while the train was being operated at a great
rate of speed and apparently without giving any statutory warning.' 3 There was testimony to the effect that the automobile
would have stopped in time, even in the absence of warning, but
for the fact that the car skidded on the icy pavement as it approached the crossing. The Supreme Court denied the jury the
right to "speculate" as to whether or not, if warning had been
given, the car could have been stopped in time,' 4 so concluded
that it was the icy condition, rather than defendant's neglect,
which furnished the proximate cause of the injury.
An interesting application of the so-called "Guest" statute 5
was furnished by the case of Miller v. Illinois Central Railroad
11326 Ill. App. 583, 63 N. E. (2d) 132 (1945).
12391 Ill. 52, 62 N. E. (2d) 676 (1945), noted in 24 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REvMW
288, affirming 323 Il1. App. 221, 55 N. E. (2d) 394 (1944).
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Oh. 114, § 59.
14 An analysis as to what would have been involved in such "speculation" is
given in a note to the Berg case appearing in 24 CMCAGO-KFNT LAW REVIEw 288,
particularly pp. 291-5.
15 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 95 , § 58a.
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Company1 6 which, while it involves no new point of law, does
present a factual situation unlike any earlier case on the subject.
The action was brought by one brother against a railroad company and another brother. It seemed that the defendant brother
had been engaged in transporting plaintiff's livestock, for hire,
to and from a certain stockyard. On the day in question, the
defendant picked up a load of cattle, including two horses belonging to the plaintiff which were to be returned to plaintiff's
farm. Plaintiff, as on other occasions, climbed aboard the truck
in order to ride home. On the way, when collision with a railroad train became imminent, plaintiff leaped from the truck
and sustained injury. The complaint was phrased in such fashion that it could not have comprehended an application of the
guest statute. Judgment for plaintiff against his brother was
reversed, the statute being held applicable, when the Appellate
Court stated the test to be used was whether "consideration is
given to the person or persons advantaged by the carriage."
It noted that if "only a benefit incident to hospitality, companionship or the like" is conferred, the passenger is a guest, but
if the carriage "tends to promote mutual interests . . . or . . .
is primarily for the attainment of some objective or purpose
of the operator" then the guest relationship does not arise.
Although mutual interests of a character existed between plaintiff and defendant, the facts did not disclose any such interests
with respect to the ride home, so plaintiff was denied the right
to sue in the absence of any wilful or wanton conduct on the
defendant's part.

10 328 In. App. 171, 65 N. E. (2d)

5W7 (1946).

